Abstract One of the main tools to construct secure two-party computation protocols are Yao garbled circuits. Using the cut-and-choose technique, one can get reasonably efficient Yao-based protocols with security against malicious adversaries. At TCC 2009, Nielsen and Orlandi [NO09] suggested to apply cut-and-choose at the gate level, while previously cut-and-choose was applied on the circuit as a whole. This appealing idea allows for a speed up with practical significance (in the order of the logarithm of the size of the circuit) and has become known as the "LEGO" construction. Unfortunately the construction in [NO09] is based on a specific number-theoretic assumption and requires public-key operations per gate of the circuit. The main technical contribution of this work is a new XOR-homomorphic commitment scheme based on oblivious transfer, that we use to cope with the problem of connecting the gates in the LEGO construction. Our new protocol has the following advantages:
Introduction
Secure computation allows two (or more) parties to compute a function of their inputs while ensuring security properties such as the privacy of the inputs and the correctness of the outputs. The first and arguably still most popular protocol for secure two-party computation is Yao's garbled circuit [Yao86, LP09] .
In recent years there has been a significant effort to bring secure computation into practice. These efforts resulted in terrific improvements in terms of algorithmic complexity, efficiency of implementations etc. (see e.g., [ST04, MNPS04, LP07, BDNP08, IPS08, LPS08, KS08, IKOS08, NO09, PSSW09, HKS + 10, LP11, LOP11, sS11, HEKM11, KsS12, DKL + 12, NNOB12, HKE12, BHR12, FN13] and references therein). Perhaps the most interesting problem is how to achieve protocols with security against malicious adversaries that are efficient enough to be used in practice.
In a nutshell, Yao's protocol works as follows: A constructs an encrypted version of the circuit to be computed (the "garbled circuit") and sends it to B who evaluates the encrypted circuit on encrypted inputs, thus learning nothing but the output of the computation. One of the main problems of this protocol is that if A is malicious she can encrypt a circuit different than the one B agreed on computing, with dramatic consequences for the correctness of the result and the privacy of B's input. One of the main tools to cope with this is the so called cut-and-choose technique: A prepares many copies of the encrypted circuit and B checks some of them for correctness. This induces a probability on the unopened circuits to be correct. Nielsen and Orlandi [NO09] presented a twist on this approach, known as LEGO: their approach consists of performing a cut-and-choose test at the gate level (instead of at circuit level), and allows to save a factor O(log(s)) with s being the circuit size, in the computation and communication complexity w.r.t., "standard" cut-and-choose at the circuit level. That is, A prepares many encrypted NAND gates, B checks some of them and, if no inconsistency is detected, the unopened gates are randomly permuted and partitioned into small "buckets". The NAND gates in each bucket are "soldered" together such that the bucket has 2 input wires, a left and right, and one output wire. The input wires are soldered to each of the NAND gates in the bucket's input wires, left to left and right to right. The output of the NAND gates in the bucket are soldered together to the output wires of the bucket such that if the output of the NAND gates are different the majority (if such exist) is going to be the value of the bucket's output wire. Thus a bucket represent a redundant version of a garbled NAND gate in the original circuit, but which computes the correct output in the presence of a minority faulty internal gates.
The LEGO approach has been praised for its novelty [Gol09] , but did not have a practical impact for the efficiency of Yao-based protocols. There are several reasons for this:
1. LEGO uses public-key primitives for each gate in the circuit: Each gate has in fact associated three commitments to its input/output keys. Those commitments are used for the "soldering" and need to be homomorphic. For this purpose LEGO uses Pedersen commitments (based on the hardness of computing discrete logarithms in some group -e.g., the group of points of an elliptic curve). This is a drawback for the efficiency of the protocol (group operations, even in an elliptic curve, are orders of magnitude slower than symmetric primitives such as hash functions or private-key encryption). Moreover, this is also a drawback as LEGO can be only implemented using a single computational assumptions -it is unclear how to implement LEGO under a variety of computational assumptions (including assumptions that are believed to withstand quantum attacks).
LEGO is not compatible with known optimization for Yao's protocol: Keys in LEGO are element of Z p
for some prime p, while using binary strings {0, 1} t is more natural and standard. Therefore, it is not possible to use the "free-XOR" trick with LEGO, nor many of the others optimizations that are tailored for bit-string keys. 3. LEGO has too many bricks: There are many different kind of objects in LEGO (key-filters, not-two gates, etc.) that make the use of LEGO complex to understand and implement.
Contributions
In this paper, we present a generalization and a simplification of the LEGO approach. The main technical difference is to replace the Pedersen commitments with some XOR-homomorphic commitments based on oblivious transfer (OT) which we believe is of independent interest and might be used in other applications. We take this direction as OT can be efficiently extended (both with passive [IKNP03] and active security [HIKN08, NNOB12] ), the price is only a few private-key operations per OT (together with a small number of "real" seed OTs that use public-key technology used to bootstrap the process). Doing so allows us to:
1. Maintain LEGO's good complexity and achieve statistical security 2 −k when the replication factor is only ρ = O(k/ log(s)) against a replication factor of ρ = O(k) for standard cut-and-choose such as the one in [LP11] 2. Implement a variant on LEGO whose security only relies on generic, symmetric primitives (except for the few seed OTs needed to bootstrap the OT extension). 3. Achieve a variant of LEGO that uses "standard" garbled gates (ANDs and free-XORs and NOTs), compatible with garbled gates optimizations.
To sum up, we propose the first real alternative to standard cut-and-choose for practical purposes Yaobased secure two-party computation. We believe that it is important to have a variety of different protocols from which implementers can choose from. Whether our proposed protocol will be more efficient in practice than protocols with standard cut-and-choose [LP07, PSSW09, sS11, KsS12, FN13] will only be decided by performing a serious comparison of similar implementations running on the same hardware-network configuration of our and other approaches. This is an interesting direction for future work. Table 1 . Comparison of the asymptotic complexity of our protocol with the competition. We let s denote the amount of non-XOR gates in a circuit, k denotes the statistical security parameter and t the computational security parameter. Finally is the amount of input bits from the players.
Model
Symmetric Asymmetric Rounds Communication (bits)
Our result ROM, OT-hybrid O(s · k/ log(s)) O(k) O(1) O(tks/ log(s)) [NNOB12]
ROM, OT-hybrid 
Technical Overview
The main idea of the protocol we present here is the same as in [NO09] : A prepares many garbled gates (NANDs in [NO09] , while here we use ANDs) together with commitments to the input and output garbled keys. If A prepares a gate dishonestly we view it as a faulty gate, i.e., one that does not give the correct output on some inputs. B asks A to open a random subset of the AND gates and checks them for correctness. If the check goes through, B randomly permutes the unopened gates into buckets representing a redundant AND gate. He solders the gates within a given bucket together and then solders the buckets together to form a circuit that computes the function even in the presence of a minority of faulty gates within each bucket. As part of this soldering NOT gates can be injected thus the garbled AND gates and the soldering alone provides a universal set of Boolean gates. As the gates have been generated independently, the output keys of the gates in one layer of the circuit cannot be directly fed as input to the next layer. Therefore, A reveals the difference between the output keys in the first layer with the corresponding input keys in the second layer (using the XOR-homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme). This allows B to "align" the input keys of the gates in one layer with the output keys of the gates in the previous layer. The main intuition for the security of LEGO cut-and-choose is as follows: If A had sent B k faulty gates, B would detect this with probability 1 − 2 −k . Therefore, if B accepts the test, with very high probability there are only a few faulty gates among the unopened ones. As all gates are permuted at random and placed in random buckets in the circuit, only very little redundancy is needed to correct for all faulty gates. The original LEGO construction in [NO09] used a set of specially tailored garbled gates and a complex design for the circuit used to deal with faulty gates. This meant that it was not possible to apply standard garbling techniques and optimizations. In contrast, the construction here can be instantiated with essentially any free-XOR compatible garbled gate scheme and is compatible with various state of the art optimizations (such as free-XOR, row-reduction, point-andpermute). Additionally, we can design the fault tolerant circuit in a very simple way: we implement each gate of the original circuit as a bucket consisting of ρ garbled gates and take the output of the bucket to be any output agreed upon by more than ρ/2 of the replicated garbled gates it contains.
Organization
We start with preliminaries and background in Section 2. We then continue to go through the overall description of the secure-two party computation protocol in Section 3. This is followed by Section 4 where we describe the main technical contribution of this paper; the XOR homomorphic commitments.
Background
In this section we formalize our goal in the (now standard) real/ideal-world simulation based universally composable security definitions for two-party computation (refer to textbooks such as [Gol04, HL10] for definitions). We furthermore list the basic building blocks of our protocol and quickly review their individual constructions.
The Ideal Functionality
In Fig. 2 the ideal functionality for secure function evaluation is presented (taken almost verbatim from [NO09] ). Note that the functionality is insecure in the sense that A can try to guess B's input bits, but if her guess is wrong B is told that A is cheating. This models a standard problem in Yao based protocols known as "selective failure attack", that can be solved by modifying the circuit to be evaluated. For instance, to evaluate a circuit
.e., B encodes his real input bit in the parity of a k bit-long string, and the modified circuit first reconstructs the real input and then evaluates the original circuit. Now, in order to guess one of B's real input bits A needs to guess correctly the k random bits, so she will fail with probability 1 − 2 −k . As our construction allows to compute XOR and NOT gates for free, this increases only marginally the time needed to construct and evaluate the circuit. On the other hand, this increases the number of OT's needed during the input phase by a factor k (but an OT extension can be used -so this is also not too bad). Better encodings can be used (See [LP07] ) to reduce the size of the encoded input from · k bits to max(4 , 8k) bits.
Circuit and inputs:
On input (init, A, k) from A and input (init, B, k) from B where A = (a, CA), B = (b, CB) proceed as follows: 1. Let k be a statistical security parameter and let CA and CB be descriptions of Boolean circuits consisting of NOT, XOR and AND gates computing the corresponding boolean functions fA, respectively fB. 2. Leak CA, CB and k to the adversary. 3. If CA = CB, then the ideal functionality outputs disagreement! to both parties and terminates. Otherwise, let C = CA and parse C as ( , C ), where ∈ N and C is a circuit with 2 input wires and output wires. I.e., we potentially add blank wires to make sure that the size of A's input, B's input and the output are the same. Thus C computes the boolean function f = fA. 4. Finally parse a as a ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ {0, 1} and return ( , C ) to both A and B. Corrupt A:
On input (corrupt) from A, let her be corrupt. She can then specify a set {(i, βi)}i∈I , where I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} and βi ∈ {0, 1}. If βi = bi for i ∈ I, then output correct! to A. Otherwise, output You were nicked! to A and output Alice cheats! to B.
Evaluation:
If both parties are honest or A was not caught above, then on input (evaluate) from both A and B the ideal functionality computes z = f (a, b) and outputs z to A. The adversary decides the time of delivery. 
Building Blocks
We here review the main building blocks of our protocol.
Generic Free-XOR Yao Gate. Our protocol works with every "free-XOR compatible" garbling scheme. In particular, it is possible to use very optimized garbling schemes. We now describe such a garbling scheme that combines the state of the art optimizations for Yao Gates i.e., free-XOR [KS08] , permutation bits [NPS99] , garbled row-reduction [NPS99] in the same way as [BHR12] .
In particular this means that to garble a gate 4 evaluations of AES are needed, and a garbled gate consists of only 3 ciphertexts (therefore saving on communication complexity). The evaluation of the gate consists of a single AES evaluation.
-We have a (possibly randomized) algorithm Yao(L 0 , R 0 , ∆, id) with id a unique gate identifier, a left input zero-key L 0 ∈ {0, 1} t , a right input zero-key R 0 ∈ {0, 1} t and a global difference ∆ ∈ {0, 1} t outputs a garbled gate gg and a output zero-key O 0 ∈ {0, 1} t . -We have a (possibly randomized) algorithm Eval(gg, L , R ) that on input a garbled gate gg, a left key L ∈ {0, 1} t and a right key R ∈ {0, 1} t outputs an output key O ∈ {0, 1} t ∪ {⊥}.
The idea is that a garbled AND gate gg has a zero-and a one-key associated with each of its wires (left input, right input and output wire), and that these keys represent the bit values on those wires. E.g., if gg is a garbled AND gate generated as (gg
Note that if A samples ∆ and a zero-key, say L 0 , at random and give the key L a to B then there is no way for B to infer the bit a from L a . Furthermore, even if B learns a he cannot guess the key L 1−a with better probability than guessing ∆. For a garbling scheme to be secure we want that even if B learns gg and keys L a and R b for a, b ∈ {0, 1}, and is able to evaluate O a∧b ← Eval(gg, L a , R b ), then he cannot guess L 1−a , R 1−b or O 1−a∧b with better probability then guessing the random string ∆, even if he knows a and/or b.
Thus B can evaluate the garbled gate gg without knowing anymore about the output than he can infer from his knowledge of a and b. Furthermore, B cannot evaluate the gate on any other inputs. Thus if B sends back O a∧b to A, A can learn a ∧ b (as she knows O 0 and ∆) and be confident that this is the correct result.
We formalize this intuition about correctness and security of a garbled gate in definition Def. 1.
Definition 1.
We say that (Yao, Eval) is a Yao free-XOR garbling scheme if the following holds:
with overwhelming probability over the choices of L 0 , R 0 , ∆ and the random coins of Yao and Eval.
Secrecy: Consider the following indistinguishability under chosen input attack game for a stateful adversary
A.
The adversary outputs two pairs of bit vectors
∈ {0, 1} 2k . The game picks a uniformly random challenge c ∈ R {0, 1}, samples ∆ ∈ R {0, 1} t and for In Fig. 3 , a free-XOR garbled gates construction, with optimizations, is presented. We briefly sketch its properties: for correctness, remember that the requirement for correctness is:
except with negligible probability over the choices of L 0 , R 0 , ∆ and the random coins of Yao and Eval. This is the case because, if we let
This garbling scheme can be proven secure under the assumption that AES (with a fixed keys) behaves like a random permutation -see [BHR12] and references therein. Note that, as with any other free-XOR based construction, we need to assume that AES satisfies some kind of related key-attack security [CKKZ12] .
We used the assumption that lsb(∆) = 1. If this is not the case, then p L0 = p L1 and therefore during the cut-and-choose phase of the protocol described in Section 3 when B challenges on (a, b) = (0, 0) an error will occur.
Notation, Convention:
Let KDF be a secure key derivation function (see [BHR12] for an efficient instantiation). Furthermore, call the least significant bit of every key the permutation bit and write pK = lsb(K) and we assume that lsb(∆) = 1 -see discussion at the end of this section.
Garbling, Yao(L0, R0, ∆, id):
With L0, R0, ∆ ∈ {0, 1} t and id a unique identifier do the following: 1. Define
4. Output a garbled gate gg = (id, α1, α2, α3) and the zero output key O0.
With L , R ∈ {0, 1} t do the following: Soldering. The idea for this component is the same as in [NO09] , however, slightly changed to support a general gate garbling scheme.
When a garbled gate gg 1 has the same zero-key (and therefore also one-key) associated to one of its wires, as is associated with one of gg 2 's wires, we say that the given wire of gg 1 is soldered to the given wire of gg 2 . This is a useful concept when we want to build circuits of garbled gates. 
In this case we say that the left input wire of gg 1 is soldered to the XOR of the output of gg 2 and gg 3 . This is because by XOR'ing the outputs keys of gg 2 and gg 3 we get the left input key of gg 1 corresponding to XOR of the outputs of gg 2 and gg 3 . This is also why we call the garbling free-XOR: we do not need to garble XOR gates, since this is handled by the soldering.
In our protocol we will first generate garbled gates where all zero-keys are picked independently, and then in a later stage we will solder the wires of the garbled gates to each other to form a garbled circuit. For this purpose, we introduce a function Shift gg, If one wish to use NOT gates then these can be implemented as part of this shifting by a simply change in the the difference, i.e., to add a NOT gate to the soldering of the left wire of a gate we simply use
To see this assume we want to put a NOT into the soldering between the output wire of gg 1 and the left wire of gg 2 . In this case we would have
If a = 0 we get the left input key for gg
Thus we clearly see that the bit represented by the left input key (along with the key itself) for gg 2 has been flipped.
Assume gg has been constructed by the call Yao(L0, R0, ∆, id) such that gg = (id, α1, α2, α3). Homomorphic commitments. To securely implement the soldering described above, we cannot simply have (potentially malicious) A send the differences needed to shift the gates. Instead we will have A give homomorphic commitments to all zero-keys of each gate, and then have her open the differences of the committed keys. Therefore we need a homomorphic commitment scheme. In Fig. 5 we state the ideal functionality F COM for such homomorphic commitments. We then show how to implement these in Section 4. The functionality allows A to commit to messages and to later reveal those messages. In addition the functionality allows to reveal the XOR of two or more committed messages to B (without revealing any extra information about the original committed messages).
The functionality is "insecure", in the sense that A can choose a set of up to κ wildcard commitments where she can change her mind about the committed value at opening time. However, openings need to be consistent. More specifically, the F COM functionality stores a system of linear equations. Initially these equations simply specify that non-wildcard commitments must be opened to the value, they were commitments to. Every time A performs an opening involving wildcard commitments this defines a new linear equation, which is stored in the ideal functionality. For an opening of a wildcard commitment to be successful the set of linear equations stored in the ideal functionality must be consistent.
If the set of equations stored in the ideal functionality restricts the opening of a commitment in such a way that it can only be opened to one value, we say that the commitment is fixed to that value. Note, that all non-wildcard commitments are fixed, and a fixed wildcard commitment can essentially be viewed as a non-wildcard commitment.
As we are treating the commitments as an ideal functionality, we need to push into the ideal functionalities two extra commands (in a way similar to the commit-and-prove functionality in [CLOS02] )): apart from the regular openings the functionality allows to open (the XOR of) committed messages in two alternative ways: In an Oblivious-Opening, B can choose between two sets of committed messages and learn the XOR of the messages in one of them. In an Or-Opening we allow A to open the XOR of one out of two sets of committed messages without revealing which one. For technical reasons there can only be a total of ω Or-Openings and all Or-Openings must be done before the first Oblivious-Opening. Also, note that there is a build-in selective failure attack in the Oblivious-Opening. However, this is not a problem as we will only use this type of opening to handle B's input where, as discussed above, the F SFE functionality already allows a selective failure attack.
Commitment from B to A. Additional to the F COM functionality we are going to use an extractable commitment Com. This commitment is used only once by B to commit to his challenge in the cut-and-choose phase and extraction is needed for simulation (to avoid selective opening issues). Since this commitment does not need to be homomorphic it can be easily implemented in the F OT -hybrid model.
The MiniLEGO Protocol
We now show how to use the ingredients outlined in the previous section in order to construct the MiniLEGO protocol. Plaintext Circuit. We denote by C the Boolean circuit to be evaluated. We assume C to be composed of NOT, XOR and AND gates. The XOR gates are allowed to have unbounded fan-in while the AND gates have fan-in 2. With each AND gate in C we associate a unique label and we let gates be the set of all these labels. A subset inputGates ⊂ gates of size 2 are specially marked as input gates. The AND gates in inputGates should be given the same bit on both input wires, so that the gate simply computes the identity function. A subset in Ainputs ⊂ inputGates of size are taken to be A's inputs. The remaining gates in Binputs = inputGates \ Ainputs are B's inputs (for convenience assume that Binputs = [ ]). A has input bits (a 1 , . . . , a ), while B has input bits (b 1 , . . . , b ).
A subset outputGates ⊂ gates of size are marked as output gates. The output of these gates are taken to be the output of the circuit. Note that this means that all output gates are AND gates. However, this is without loss of generality: Any circuit with one or more XOR gates as output gates can easily be modified to an equivalent circuit with AND gates as output gates by adding at most AND gates. The output bits are denoted (z 1 , . . . , z ).
The wiring of the circuit C is described by two functions lp, rp : gates \ inputGates → 2 gates∪{1} . We call lp(j) the left parents of j (resp. rp(j) the right parents of j), and take the left (resp. right) input of j to be the XOR of the output bits of all gates in lp(j) (resp. rp(j)). Thus, the XOR gates of C are implicitly defined by the lp and rp functions. If the special symbol 1 is included in the set returned by lp, rp, this means that a NOT gate is inserted between gate j and its parent gate (i.e., the input is XORed with the constant 1). We assume that C does not have loops and it is ordered i.e., max(lp(j)) < j and max(rp(j)) < j.
If lp(j) (resp. rp(j)) is not a singleton, it is intended that the input value of gate j is the XOR of the outputs of the gates in lp(j) (resp. rp(j)). This is just a convenient notation for our construction, given that XOR gates can be evaluated for free.
Garbled Circuit. Let Γ = 2ρs for s = |gates| and some replication factor ρ ∈ N. For our protocol A will construct Γ garbled gates. She constructs twice as many garbled gates as is needed to build the garbled circuit, because half the gates are going to be checked during the cut-and-choose phase. We choose to check exactly half for the sake of presentation but, as in [sS11] , this could be changed to any fraction in order to optimize concrete efficiency.
Bucket Notation. In the protocol individual garbled gates are combined together in "buckets" of gates. We introduce here some convenient notation that allow us to address the gates in a bucket, the bucket of a gate etc. Let B be the family of ρ-to-1, ρ-wise independent functions from a set U ⊂ [Γ ] of size ρs to gates. For a function BucketOf ∈ B let Bucket be the function that, for all j ∈ gates outputs the set {i ∈ U |BucketOf(i) = j}. Let BucketHead(j) be the function that returns the "first" (in lexicographic order) element of Bucket(j).
There are Γ = 3Γ + 1 keys in the protocol, because every constructed AND gate has a left, right and output key and in addition there is a global difference ∆. The key index is written as a superscript while subscripts are in {0, 1} and describe the value carried by the key i.e.,
t returns a unique label for that key. We will sometimes abuse notation and
. This will simplify the notation when using the F COM functionality.
Protocol Specification
The protocol π LEGO in Fig. 7 progresses in six phases: Setup, Garbling, Cut-and-choose, Soldering, Input and Evaluation. Here we describe these phases one by one.
During Setup, A or B initialize the F COM functionality by calling (init, ID, W ) with |ID| = Γ and |W | ≤ k. For the remainder of the protocol if F COM outputs Alice cheats, B will abort the protocol. Then A samples the global difference ∆ and commits to it using the commit command in F COM . B samples his challenge for the cut-and-choose phase and the BucketOf function as described above, and commits to both using the extractable commitment Com. B also "commits" to his input using the OT-choose command of the F COM functionality. These commitments of B's are needed to avoid selective opening issues in the cut-and-choose phase and reduce the security of the protocol to the IND-CIA game.
In Garbling, A constructs the candidate garbled gates (gg i ) i∈ [Γ ] and commits to the input/output zero-keys of each garbled gate using F COM .
In Cut-and-choose, B reveals his challenge. The challenge consists of a set of indices T ⊂ [Γ ] of size ρs and a sequence of bits (u i , v i ) i∈T , indicating that B wants to test garbled gate gg i on input (u i , v i ). A opens the corresponding input and output keys for the test gates, allowing B to check for correctness. Note that B only tests one set of inputs for each gate -otherwise he will learn ∆.
In the remainder of the protocol the garbled gates that are not checked in Cut-and-choose, those with indices in U = [Γ ] \ T , are used to build a garbled circuit according to the following fault tolerant circuit design: With each gate j ∈ gates we associate a bucket of ρ AND gates. To evaluate gate j we will evaluate each gate in the bucket of j on the inputs given to j. If more than ρ/2 of the gates in the bucket agree on their output bit, we take this bit to be the output of j (otherwise the output is ⊥). Clearly if there are more than ρ/2 non-faulty gates in each bucket the output obtained in this way is correct. See Fig. 6 for a pictorial description.
To build such a garbled circuit the gates that were not checked (gg i ) i∈U are assigned into buckets using the BucketOf function. Then B uses the Shift function as described in Section 2 to solder the wires of the garbled gates. Note that since A may be malicious we cannot simply have her sent the XOR's of zero-keys that B needs for soldering. Instead A reveals the XOR's by opening the corresponding commitments to the zero-keys.
In this way the garbled circuit is constructed in Soldering in three different soldering steps: For all j ∈ gates Horizontal Soldering solders all wires of all gates in (gg i ) i∈Bucket(j) to the corresponding wires of gg BucketHead(j) . This allows to evaluate all the gates in the same bucket on the same input keys and get the same output keys. I.e., if A is honest, after the horizontal soldering all the gates in one bucket have exactly the same keys. For all j ∈ gates Vertical Soldering solders the left input wire of gg BucketHead(j) to the XOR of the output wires of gg
, and the right input wire of gg BucketHead(j) to the XOR of the output wires of gg
(and we use the convention O 1 = ∆ to deal with NOT gates -note that ∆ can be seen as the 1 key of a special wire with zero-key equal to 0 t ). Note that since Horizontal Soldering made all garbled gates in a bucket have the same input keys, this essentially means soldering all the gates in the bucket to the output wires of gates in (Bucket(i)) i∈lp(j) and (Bucket(i)) i∈rp(j) . I.e., vertical soldering is "functional", in the sense that it make sure that the garbled circuit computes the right circuit, C . For all j ∈ inputGates Input Soldering simply solders the left and right input wire of garbled gates in Bucket(j) to each other. This means that the gates in inputGates simply compute the identity function.
In Input, for all j ∈ Ainputs A uses the Or-Opening command of F COM to open the input key to the garbled gates in Bucket(j) corresponding to her input bit. For all j ∈ Binputs B also learns the input key to the garbled gates in Bucket(j) corresponding to his input bit, using the Oblivious-Opening command.
Given the initial input keys in Evaluation B evaluates each bucket of garbled gates in the following way: He evaluates each gate in the bucket on the left and right input keys for that bucket. If a key appears more than ρ/2 times as the output key of the garbled gates in the bucket, he takes this to be the output key of the bucket. If no such key exists B aborts. Note that by the way we soldered the garbled circuit, this corresponds exactly to the fault tolerant circuit we described above. Finally B provides A with the output keys. Knowing ∆, A can decipher the output keys and obtain the output values. 
Analysis.
A full proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A. However, we quickly sketch the idea of the proof. First considering a corrupted B and then considering a corrupted A.
Corrupted B. B does not receive any output nor has any real way of cheating in the protocol (in the output phase, if B changes the output key in a way that makes A accept, then he must have guessed ∆, thus breaking the IND-CIA game). Essentially, we only need to argue that his view does not leak any information, thanks to the IND-CIA security of the garbling scheme. Note that in the protocol B starts by committing to his input and challenge for the cut-and-choose phase. This allows the simulator S to extract all this information at the beginning of the simulation (and provide input on behalf of corrupted B to the ideal functionality). Then we reduce the security of the protocol to the IND-CIA security of the garbling scheme: The simulator knows in fact T and U before it sends the gates to B, therefore S will place honestly constructed gates in T (for which it knows the openings and therefore can easily simulate the cut-and-choose test -remember that the simulator fully controls F COM ) and the challenge garbled gates from the IND-CIA game in U : that is, the simulator produces a view such that distinguishing between a real and a simulated execution is equivalent to winning the IND-CIA game.
Corrupted A. Essentially, the proof of security boils down to proving correctness. By the design of the garbled circuit correctness follows when there is more than ρ/2 correct gates in each of the buckets.
The LEGO approach ensures that if A passes the cut-and-choose test, then with overwhelming probability there are at most k faulty gates left in U . Those faulty gates are then randomly assigned into buckets, this means that with overwhelming probability each bucket will have a majority of correct gates.
Setup
Choose ρ = O(k/ log(s)) and Γ = 2ρs where s = |gates| in C . Let Γ = 3Γ + 1 and proceed as follows: 
4. B samples BucketOf ∈ B as described in Section 2. 5. B sends CT = Com(T, (ui, vi)i∈T , BucketOf, rT ) to A. 6. For each j ∈ Binputs, B inputs (OT-choose, j, bj) to
Cut-and-choose
1. B sends T , (ui, vi)i∈T , BucketOf and randomness rT to A.
If this is not a valid opening of CT
A aborts. Otherwise, for all i ∈ T A inputs to F COM open, id L i u i , open, id R i v i , open, id O i u i ∧v i . LetL i ,R i ,Ô i be the values output to B by F COM . 3. B aborts if there is an i ∈ T so thatÔ i = Eval gg i ,L i ,R i . Soldering 1. Horizontal Soldering: For all j ∈ gates, let h = BucketHead(j): For all i = h ∈ Bucket(j) A in- puts open, id L h , id L i , open, id R h , id R i , and open, id O h , id O i to F COM . Let L i d , R i d , O i d be the keys output to B from F COM and sgg i = Shift gg i , L i d , R i d , O i d . 2. Vertical Soldering: For all j ∈ gates \ inputGates, let h = BucketHead(j): A inputs open, id L h ∪ id O BucketHead(i) i∈lp(j) and open, id R h ∪ id O BucketHead(i) i∈rp(j) to F COM . Let L h d , R h d be the keys output to B by F COM and sgg h = Shift gg h , L h d , R h d , 0 t . 3. Input Soldering: For all j ∈ inputGates, let h = BucketHead(j): A inputs open, id L h , id R h to F COM . Let R h d be the key output to B by F COM and sgg h = Shift sgg h , 0 t , R h d , 0 t . Input 1. For all j ∈ Ainputs let h = BucketHead(j), A inputs OR-open, id L h 0 , id L h 1 , aj to F COM . 2. For all j ∈ Binputs let h = BucketHead(j), A inputs OT-open, j, id L h 0 , id L h 1 to F COM .
In both cases letL
h be the key output from F COM to B. B computes a list of candidate keys
. If any key appears more than ρ/2 times in Candj name itÔ j , otherwise B aborts. Evaluate 1. For each gate j ∈ gates \ inputGates, B computes: (a) Left and right keysL
.
(c) If a key appears more than ρ/2 times in Candj name itÔ j and proceed, otherwise abort. 2. For all j ∈ outputGates, B sendsÔ j to A. 3. For all j ∈ outputGates, A outputs zj = 0 ifÔ
and aborts otherwise. However, as opposed to [NO09] where all commitments were binding, here we have also k wildcard commitments to deal with. This is in problematic, as wildcard commitments can be opened to anything, and we need make sure that this does not break correctness.
To be more specific we say that a garbled gate gg i is faulty if the commitments to its input and output zero-keys are fixed to values L 1 . In Lemma 2 we show that, with overwhelming probability, there will be a majority of fault free gates in gg i i∈Bucket (j) for all j ∈ gates. It is easy to verify that this means that after Horizontal Soldering all commitments to zero-keys are fixed. I.e., the commitment to the zero-key of a faulty wire will be fixed to open as one specific value. If this value is not consistent with the zero-keys used to generate the associated garbled gate, then that gate becomes faulty.
Note however, that for all j ∈ gates all fault free shifted gates sgg i i∈Bucket (j) resulting from Horizontal Soldering will have identical input and output keys, as required of the garbled circuit, even if some gates in gg i i∈Bucket (j) had faulty wiring. I.e., the effect of a garbled gate gg i having faulty wiring is at worst that shifted gate sgg i after Soldering is faulty. Since we use a F COM functionality with at most k wildcard commitments we still have at most k faulty gates in Evaluation. Since these faulty gates are placed in random buckets we can still guarantee correctness with overwhelming probability.
Note that the faulty wires are also the reason for gate replication on the input layer, to not let A change her or B's input by using the wildcard commitments.
Commitments
In this section we present our novel construction of XOR-homomorphic commitment based solely on OT. To the best of our knowledge this is the first kind of homomorphic cryptographic primitive that can be obtained under general assumption. We also describe how to transform this general construction of XOR-homomorphic commitments into the specific type we need for the MiniLEGO protocol described inFig. 7.
The Ideal Functionality
We name our ideal functionality F WCOM and describe it in Fig. 8 . The functionality allows A to commit to up to µ messages and to later reveal those messages. In addition the F WCOM allows to reveal the XOR of two or more committed messages to B (without revealing any extra information about the original committed messages). In the context of Fig. 7 this is the same as F COM except without the methods for ObliviousOpening, Or-Opening and (which will become apparent later on) contains more wildcards than we can handle in the MiniLEGO protocol describedFig. 7.
We formalize F WCOM in the following way: First we let the adversary specify a set of identifiers ID with |ID| = µ used to identify each of the µ commitments (for technical reasons ID will be a subset of [2µ]). In addition the adversary gives a set W ⊂ ID, of size at most κ, to identify the wildcard commitments. F WCOM stores a set of linear equations on µ variables (X i ) i∈ID (one for each commitment). Initially this set is empty. Each time A commits to a message m j using a non-wildcard commitment (i.e., j ∈ ID \ W ) F WCOM will store the equation X j = m j . For wildcard commitments no such equation are stored when A makes the commitment. In these cases, when a commitment can only successfully be opened to one value, we say that the commitment is fixed to that value. Non-wildcard commitments are always fixed; when A opens the XOR of a wildcard commitments and non-wildcard commitments, a wildcard commitment can become fixed. When a wildcard commitment has been fixed it can essentially be viewed as a non-wildcard commitment.
Notice that the terminology can become a little confusing because of the wildcard commitments: When we say that A opens the XOR of some set of commitments J ⊂ ID to a value m J , then we cannot guarantee that m J = j∈J m j , when J ∩ W = ∅.
Setup
On input (init, ID, W ) with |ID| = µ, |W | ≤ κ and W ⊂ ID from the adversary output ID to both parties and let J = ∅. If A is honest, then W = ∅.
Commit
On input (commit, j ∈ ID, mj) with mj ∈ {0, 1} t from A, and where no value of the form (j, ·) is stored, store (j, mj). 
Building blocks
Here we give the building blocks from which we implement F WCOM .
Oblivious Transfer. We use a n u -Oblivious Transfer functionality with message strings of length 2µ. We denote this functionality n u -F OT (2µ). On input start from both A and B the n u -F OT (2µ) functionality picks n message strings S 1 , . . . , S n ∈ R {0, 1} 2µ , a uniformly random set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| = u and outputs (S i ) i∈ [n] to A and (I, (S i ) i∈I ) to B. We can implement n u -F OT (2µ) for any 2µ = poly(k) using a F OT functionality and a pseudo random generator (prg), where k is the security parameter, using the same technique as in [NNOB12] : Simply use the F OT (k) functionality to send seeds to the prg and then use the prg to expand those seeds to 2µ bits. One can then construct a n u -F OT (2µ) functionality from 2 1 F OT (2µ) e.g., as described in [NP99] .
Error Correcting Codes. We also need an error correcting code (ECC), which encodes an t-bit string as an n-bit string with minimal distance at least d using some φ-bits of randomness. It should at the same time be a secret sharing scheme in that seeing u random positions of a random codeword does not leak information on the message. We denote this scheme by ssecc Error correction For all m ∈ {0, 1} t , r ∈ {0, 1} φ and error vectors e ∈ {0, 1} n with hw(e) < d/2 it holds that dec(enc(m; r) ⊕ e) = m, where hw is the Hamming weight in {0, 1} n . We assume that dec(C) = ⊥ when C has distance more than d/2 to all codewords and we assume that there exists an efficient algorithm ncw such that ncw(enc(m; r) ⊕ e) = enc(m; r) when hw(e) We further require of the parameters of ssecc that: n = Θ(k), u = Θ(n) and d = Θ(n). I.e., both the privacy and minimum distance of ssecc must be a constant fraction of the length of codewords, and the code should have constant rate. Codes that satisfy the desired properties can be found in [CC06] .
Protocol Specification
Here we describe the ideas behind the protocol π WCOM (described in Fig. 9 ) implementing F WCOM (described in Fig. 8) .
Let v ∈ {0, 1} n and
. We define the function w I : {0, More precisely let d = 2w + 1 be the minimum distance of ssecc for some w < n 2 and suppose a corrupt A gives the commitment, c ⊕ T . Note that when A is corrupt c does not have to be a codeword. In that case we have that c = ncw(c) ⊕ e for some error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n , and we say the commitment has hw(e) errors. 
Assume that w = w n and u = u n for constants 0 < u , w < 1, then the probability of A breaking the binding property is at most
Thus with k being the security parameter, n = Θ(k) and for any positive constants u , w with 0 < u , w < 1 A will have negligible probability of breaking binding.
Notice, that while c will have distance at least w to c it could be that c is much closer to c. E.g., c could be the nearest codeword to c. In this case, by a similar calculation as the one above, we have that, if the commitment has very few errors, a cheating A could open the commitment to m with noticeable probability (say, if the number of errors were constant in k). This is not a problem since such a "slightly wrong" commitment can be seen as a commitment to the message m encoded by the nearest codeword c .
To get XOR-homomorphic commitments, more work has to be done. The problem being that the XOR of several commitments with errors, may become a commitment that breaks binding, even if the individual commitments only have a few errors. Consider a number of commitments made with non-codewords c i with nearest codewords c i . The XOR the non-codewords c = i c i may then be very far from the XOR of their nearest codewords c = i c i . In fact c might be so far away from c that it gets very close to some other codeword c . Hence the XOR of the commitments can be opened to a message different from the XOR of the message associated with the individual commitments. This would break the binding property.
To deal with this problem, the protocol starts by letting A commit to 2µ random messages. We then do a cut-and-choose test to check that half of these commitments can be opened correctly. If A passes the test we have that, with overwhelming probability, the remaining commitments only have a few errors. Additionally, those errors must be isolated to a few common bit positions. Thus the result of XOR'ing these commitments will at most have a few a errors in the same positions.
Thus if A passes the cut-and-choose test we use the un-tested random commitments to implement the actual commitments. The resulting commitment will have exactly the same errors as the random commitment (if any). Fig. 9 UC, Analysis. Simulating when no party is corrupted or both parties are corrupted is straight forward. Simulating when B is corrupted is also quite simple, and can be done using standard techniques from simulation in secure multi-party computation based on secret sharing. Thus we will only sketch the proof for corrupted B, and focus the case of corrupted A. A sketch of the proof of security against a malicious A is included below and the formal proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let k be the security parameter and use a code with n = Θ(k), u = Θ(n), d = Θ(n) and k < d/2 as, e.g., given by [CC06]. Then the protocol in

Setup
To set up the scheme A and B run the following. 1. A and B run a n u -F OT (2µ) functionality and get as output (Ri) i∈ [n] and (I, (Ri)i∈I ) respectively where R1, . . . , Rn ∈R {0, 1} 2µ and I is a uniformly random subset of [n] with |I| = u.
A lets R ∈ {0, 1}
n×2µ be the matrix with Ri as the i'th row and lets Tj ∈ {0, 1} n be the j'th column of R a . 3. For j = 1, . . . , 2µ A samples xj ∈R {0, 1} t , rj ∈R {0, 1} φ and sends the commitment cj = (enc(xj; rj) ⊕ Tj, j) to B. We let cj = (Uj, j) denote the value received by B. 4. B sends a uniformly random subset C ⊂ [2µ]. This also defines ID =C. 5. For j ∈ C, A opens cj by sending oj = (xj, rj, j). 6. For j ∈ C, B receives (x j , r j , j) and checks that wI enc x j ; r j = wI (Uj) ⊕ wI (Tj) , if not B terminates the protocol.
Commit
To commit to mj for j ∈ ID A sends (yj, j) to B where yj is the correction value yj = xj ⊕ mj.
Open
To open the XOR of commitments J ⊂ ID the parties do the following. Corrupted B. The simulator commits to 0 t in all commitments. When asked to open such a commitment U j to a given m j ∈ {0, 1} t it uses the efficient algorithm xpl to explain the commitment as U j = enc(x j ; r j ) ⊕ T j for x j = y j ⊕ m j . The only non-trivial detail is that if the simulator is asked to open a commitment, where the value of the opening follows from previous openings (i.e., using some linear equation), it computes the opening as a linear combination of the previous simulated openings. As an example, if the simulator opened U j as U j = enc(x j ; r j ) ⊕ T j and opened
Corrupted A. Intuition of the proof when A is corrupted is that the cut-and-choose test will catch A if there are many indices i for which there exists a commitment that has an error in position i. This is because if the errors of the commitments are very spread out, with high probability, many of them will be in the watch bits positions. As mentioned above, this means that almost all errors must be isolated in a few positions. Therefore XOR's of commitments will also have errors only in these position, so the XOR's will also be close to their "correct" codeword. The formal proof is complicated by the fact that a few commitments with many errors, or errors outside isolated few positions, may pass the cut-and-choose. These commitments will be the wildcards. It can be shown that not even a commitment with many errors can be opened to two different values, as it would give a codeword encoding a non-zero value which is 0 in all the watch bits, which happens with negligible probability by the watch bits being random and the minimal distance high. This translates into it being impossible to make any combination of openings of linear equations yielding inconsistent outputs.
Completing construction
We now give a few simple modifications to F WCOM and π WCOM that we will need for our concrete use in the MiniLEGO protocol described in Fig. 7 . In particular we show the protocol π COM which extends π WCOM and implements the functionality F COM already defined in Fig. 5 .
First, as we want to treat the commitments as an ideal functionality, we need to push into the ideal functionality two extra commands (in a way similar to the commit-and-prove functionality in [CLOS02] ). The first one allows to perform Oblivious-Opening i.e., B can choose between two sets and learn the XOR of the committed messages in one of them, without learning anything about the other set. Additionally, we need a command to allow A to open the XOR of committed messages in one out of two sets to B without revealing which one. In other words, A proves that one of the two sets of committed messages XORs to the opened message, without revealing which one. We call this an Or-Opening. Note, that for technical reasons there can at most be ω Or-Openings an all Or-Openings must be done before the first Oblivious-Opening. The parameter ω can be any polynomial of the security parameter but it must be known when setting up the functionality.
Second, we need to strengthen the protocol to have only k wildcard commitments instead of nk + k as the protocol F WCOM .
Finally, note that we already described the F WCOM functionality with these commands added (F COM ) in This solution has an inherent selective failure attack: A corrupt A could compute one opening honestly and the other in a way that is sure to make B reject the opening. This way A will either learn b or she will be caught. However, in our concrete use of F COM in Section 3 it turned out that we can live with this attack. Therefore, instead of trying to handle the attack we make it explicit in the F COM functionality that such attacks are allowed for a corrupted A.
Note also that the actual Oblivious-Opening described in Fig. 5 is of a form where B first inputs his bit b and then only later does A instruct F COM to open the XOR of J b to B. This is needed for our concrete use of F COM in Section 3. Again this can be implement very simply: A One Time Pads (OTP) the openings before she inputs them to F OT . Later when she wants to open to B she sends both OTP keys to B, which allows B to recover o J b .
We give a formal description of the implementation extended with the Oblivious-Opening in Fig. 10 , and we prove the following Theorem in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. Let k be the security parameter and use an ECC with
as, e.g., given by [CC06] . Then the protocol Fig. 10 UC, active, static securely implements the Oblivious-Opening command of F COM described in Fig. 5 in the n u -F OT (2µ), F OT -hybrid model.
Setup
As in Fig. 9 . Commit As in Fig. 9 . Open As in Fig. 9 .
Oblivious-Opening
To do an Oblivious-Opening with the sets of commitments J0 and J1 the parties does the following. 1. A computes openings oJ 0 and oJ 1 of the XOR of commitments in the sets J0 and J1 respectively as she would for regular openings described in step 1 of the Open phase of Fig Less Wildcards. We now show how our scheme can be strengthened to have k wildcard commitments instead of nk + k. A uses F WCOM to commit to 2µ random values x i (instead of just µ values). Then we randomly pair all the commitments into µ pairs, open the XOR of each pair, and use the left element in each pair as the commitment of F WCOM , sending just a correction value y i as the actual commitment (similar to the protocol in Fig. 9 ). The idea being that if any wildcard commitment i is paired with a non-wildcard commitment j it will become fixed by opening the XOR of the pair. Therefore, the resulting commitments are only wildcard if they were in a pair where both commitments were wildcard commitments. If we take µ > (nk + k) 2 , then the probability that there are more than k such pairs of wildcard commitments is negligible. We describe the protocol formally in the Setup, Commit and Open phases of Fig. 11 and give a proof of the following Theorem in Appendix C. However, if A commits to m 0 and m 1 using wildcard commitments she can open the commitments as she pleases, and soundness drops to 0. To deal with this, we let B randomly choose the indices used by A to commit to m 0 and m 1 . Now with high probability there will be k repetitions where neither m 0 nor m 1 are committed to using wildcard commitments.
We formally describe the protocol used to implement F COM with the Or-Opening command in Fig. 11 and prove the following Theorem in Appendix C. In conclusion, to implement the F COM functionality we first use n u -F OT (2(2(µ + 6kω))) to get F WCOM with |ID| = 2(µ+6kω) and |W | ≤ nk+k (Theorem 2). We then use this to implement the Oblivious-Opening functionality (Theorem 3). From that we reduce the amount of wildcards from nk + k to k at the expense of half the commitments (Theorem 4). Finally, we add the Or-Opening command (Theorem 5) and get the full F COM functionality for |ID | = µ and |W | ≤ k. This is summarized in the following corollary: Corollary 1. Let k be the security parameter, µ > (nk + k) 2 > 6k 2 , ω = poly(k) and assume a code ssecc with n = Θ(k), u = Θ(n), d = Θ(n) and k < d/2 as, e.g., [CC06] . Then F COM is UC, active and static secure in the 
A Proof of Theorem 1
To do this proof we first show Lemma 1, which shows that the theorem is true for a malicious B. We then prove Lemma 2 which is needed in order to show security against a malicious A. We finish by proving Lemma 3. From these proofs the theorem follows directly. Lemma 1. π LEGO is a secure implementation of F SFE against a malicious B * .
Proof (Lemma 1).
We present a simulator S that given access to F SFE simulates the real world view of the environment Z when Z corrupts B * . At the beginning of the simulation Z inputs (a, C A , k) and (b, C B , k) to A and S respectively, and A inputs (init, (a, C A ) , k) to F SFE . The simulator receives ( , C ) from F SFE and then runs π LEGO completely as an honest A with input 0 , C except that the simulator fully controls the F COM functionality. Thus S reads the input b * used by B * as it is given to the F COM functionality in step 6 of Setup, and S can extract the challenges chosen by B * in step 5 of Setup. To conclude the simulation, if B * does not cause the protocol to abort, S inputs (init, (b
To argue indistinguishability of the Z's view in the real and ideal world we reduce to the security of garbling scheme (Yao, Eval). Thus we consider an adversary A in the IND-CIA game as defined in Def. 1 that makes use of Z and B * . We will construct A so that, depending on the value of the challenge c chosen by the IND-CIA game, A produces a view for Z that is either indistinguishable from the real world view or the ideal world simulation of S.
A first runs Z to get the inputs A = (a, C A ) for A. When B * in step 5 and 6 of Setup inputs T , (u i , v i ) i∈T , BucketOf and b * A reads these values. Now A uses the IND-CIA game to generate the garbled gates to hand to B * . A constructs its two strings to IND-CIA so that A receives keys to evaluate the garbled circuit, as specified by T and BucketOf, on inputs (a, b * ) for c = 0, and on inputs 0 , b * for c = 1. Additionally A will construct the strings so that for either value of c, A receives the keys needed to evaluate the gates in the cut-and-choose challenge.
To this end A evaluates C (a, b * ) and for each gate j ∈ gates records the left and right inputs l where
Given these strings the
to A, and A hands gg
A then computes the output keys
are enough for A to compute the correct value of all the strings she needs to open in
Cut-and-choose and Soldering: For Cut-and-choose
where the second equality is by the correctness of (Yao, Eval) and definition ofâ h c andb h c . Similarly A can compute all the other differences needed in Soldering.
Thus A can simulate Cut-and-choose and Soldering as it fully controls the F COM functionality. Similarly A can simulate Input by simply sending the input keys given by the IND-CIA game to B * on behalf of the F COM functionality.
In Evaluation A receivesÔ j for each j ∈ outputGates from B * . Now since A has all the same keys for the garbled circuit as B * , she can compute the keys O j that an honest B would have sent. Thus A aborts if
A then outputs whatever Z outputs. Denote by F the event that B * outputs aÔ it is easy to verify that when c = 0 the view produced by A towards Z is perfectly indistinguishable to the real world view, while for c = 1 the view is perfectly indistinguishable from the ideal world simulation of S. Thus any advantage of Z in distinguishing the real from ideal world directly translates into advantage of A in the IND-CIA game. Thus assuming F does not occur and (Yao, Eval) is secure the ideal and real worlds are indistinguishable. Now assume F does occur. In this case A aborts the protocol whereas S and honest A does not. To handle this we argue that F only occurs with negligible probability. In fact, if F occurs and B * outputs aÔ
to get all keys for some garbled gate and therefore distinguish. By assumption that F does occur this allows A to win the IND-CIA game with noticeable probability.
Before we show security for corrupted A, we show in Lemma 2 that if the protocol does not abort in Cut-and-choose then for the remainder of the protocol there will be more than ρ/2 fault free garbled gates in each of the buckets with overwhelming probability. We note that in [Orl11] a similar lemma is proved, however, there they did not have the wildcard commitments to worry about.
Lemma 2.
Consider the protocol π LEGO with honest B. Let k be the statistical security parameter and ρ = O(k/ log(s)) and assume A in Garbling prepares f faulty gates and v gates with faulty wiring. Let -E 1 be the event that the protocol does not abort in Cut-and-choose. -E 2 be the event that, before Soldering, there exists a j ∈ gates so that (gg i ) i∈Bucket(j) does not have more than ρ/2 fault free gates.
be the sets of indices of all garbled gates that are faulty or have faulty wiring respectively and let G = F ∪V . Note that by the definition of faulty gates and faulty wiring F ∩V = ∅. Let b = |G| = f +v, r i = |Bucket(i) ∪ G| and R = |{i ∈ [s]|r i > ρ/2} (Here we assume wlog ρ to be odd).
Then for each garbled gate in {gg i } i∈F we have that i ∈ T with probability 1/2, and that if i ∈ T then gg i will be detected as being faulty with probability at least 1/4. I.e., we have
To bound Pr(E 2 ) ≤ Pr(R > 0), first notice that Pr(r i > ρ/2) is the same for any i ∈ [s]. Thus by union bound we have
The event r 1 > ρ/2 we can describe in terms of the following experiment: from a collection of ρs balls were b balls are red and ρs − b balls are green pick at random ρ balls. The probability that we pick q red balls in this way is exactly Pr(r 1 = q). I.e., r 1 follows a hyper geometric distribution and we have
Note that we can assume b ≥ q or this probability is clearly 0. Writing out the binomial coefficients we get
Assume ρ ≥ q > ρ/2 and focus on the last two products of (2). Then we have
where the inequality follows from b ≥ q. If we plug this into (2) we get
Plugging this into (1) we have
Now since v ≤ k by definition of the F COM functionality, we have as stated in the lemma
It is easy to verify (simply by finding the derivative) that this is maximized for f = 6 ρ/2 / ln(2) − k. Thus we have
where the third inequality is true since (ρ − 1)/2 ≥ ρ/3 which follows from the assumption on ρ.
Lemma 3. π LEGO s a secure implementation of F SFE against a malicious A.
Proof (Lemma 3).
We present a simulator S that given access to F SFE simulates the real world view of the environment Z when Z corrupts A * . At the beginning of the simulation Z inputs (init, (b, C B ), k) to B who inputs it to F SFE . So S receives C B = ( , C ) from F SFE and then runs π LEGO as an honest B with input B = 0 , C B towards A * . In step 2 of Input S cannot immediately simulate the F COM functionality as it does not know the input b of the honest B. I.e., it does not know if the F COM would output Alice cheats making the real world protocol abort. However, S can check for each j ∈ Binputs if there is a value of b j ∈ {0, 1} that would make F WCOM output Alice cheats. For each j where such a value of b j exists denote that valueb j (if more than one such value exists S can safely abort the protocol) and let ζ be set of all such j's. Then S sets β j = 1 − b j and inputs B = (j, β j ) j∈ζ to F SFE . Note, that this perfectly simulates the selective failure attack that A * might do.
Since S fully controls F COM through out the protocol, S can extract any information A * inputs to F COM . This includes all committed keys, the indicies of wildcard commitments W and A * 's input a * . Also, S can extract the value ∆ from the commitment done in step 2 Setup. The only problem is that if the commitment to ∆ is a wildcard commitment, S cannot be sure that A * will use this value of ∆ later in the protocol. However, even if the commitment to ∆ is a wildcard commitment it will become fixed as soon as it is opened XOR a non-wildcard commitment. This happens in Cut-and-choose if for some i ∈ T u i = 1 and id(L i ) ∈ W (or v i = 1 and id(R i ) ∈ W respectively). Say that this does occurs for some i ∈ T and A * opens the XOR of the two commitments to K, then since S can extract the value L i it can also compute ∆ = L i ⊕ K which is the value that the commitment to ∆ is now fixed to open to by F COM . The probability that ∆ does not become fixed in this way for some i ∈ T is negligible. To see this consider that there is at most κ wildcard commitments but |T | = ρs, thus the since the challenges u i and v i are sampled uniformly at random, the probability that ∆ is not fixed is at most 2 κ−sρ . By assumption that s ≥ κ 4 this probability is negligible. I.e., regardless of whether or not A * commits to ∆ using a wildcard commitment, S learns ∆ with overwhelming probability.
If A * did not make the protocol abort, S inputs a * to F SFE and learns the output z. By Lemma 2 and the discussion above we have that, with overwhelming probability, all buckets have a majority of fault free shifted gates that have the same input and output keys. S can now, for all j ∈ outputGates, compute keys corresponding to the actual outputs, i.e., O Now we argue that the view of A * is statistically indistinguishable (in the (F COM )-hybrid model) when playing with a real B and when playing with the simulator S. This is by construction: Note that in the protocol the only information that travels from B to A * is 1. in step 1 of Cut-and-choose, when B opens the commitment Com and the simulator does this as an honest B would do. 2. B's reaction to the selective failure attack A * may use in step 2 of Input, but as we have argued above, this is simulated perfectly. 3. In step 3 of Evaluate, when B reveals the output keys to A.
So as long as the simulator S sends the correct output keys to A * , the views are identical. It follows from the construction that the simulator S will send the wrong keys only if output of a real execution of the protocol and the output of the ideal functionality are different.
Those outputs are identical if all buckets have a majority of fault free gates (this is by construction), and by Lemma 2 this happens with overwhelming probability.
B Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we formally prove the security of our homomorphic commitment scheme.
Proof. We first describe how to simulate the setup phase against a corrupt A * . The simulator simulates the ideal functionality n u -F OT (2µ) to the adversarial A * and records the outputs (R i ) i∈ [n] and (I, (R i ) i∈I ). The simulator lets R ∈ {0, 1} n×2µ be the matrix with R i as the i'th row and lets T j ∈ {0, 1} n be the j'th column of R. Then the simulator runs the rest of the setup as B would have done. What remains is to input to the ideal functionality ID =C along with a set W specifying which commitments should be wildcard commitments.
We describe how W is computed. When A * sends a commitment (U j , j), compute S j = U j ⊕ T j , let N j = ncw(S j ) and let e j = N j ⊕ S j , where ncw gives the nearest codeword, i.e., e j is the smallest error of S j relative to the error correcting code. Let E ∈ {0, 1} n×2µ be the matrix with e i as the i'th column We now describe how to simulate a commitment. Record the received value (y j , j). Let x j = dec(N j ), for the value N j computed when the j'th commitment was received in the setup phase as described above. Let m j = y j ⊕ x j , and input (commit, j, m j ) to the ideal functionality. Again the simulation is clearly perfect.
We describe how to simulate an opening. Let c j = (U j , j) be the commitments sent earlier and let y j be the correction value sent at commit time. Let o J = (x J , r J , J) be the opening. Iff We prove that each of these events occur with negligible probability. We start with the first case. For j ∈ J, let m j be the values computed by the simulator, i.e.,
For the first event to happen we have that A * opened the commitment to some m J for which
Since the opening was of the form o J = (x J , r J , J) with
and the output of the opening is defined to be
we get that
which we will take as the basis for our contradiction. Note for later use how the correction values y j cancel out and m J = j∈J m j became x J = j∈J x j . We later use this to simplify the proof of the more involved second event.
From S j = U j ⊕ T j and (3) we get
Using the argument from the discussion in Section 4, it follows from the above equation that except with negligible probability
Namely, if dec j∈J S j = x J , then j∈J S j and enc(x J ; r J ) would have Hamming distance at least d/2 and then w I (enc(x J ; r J )) = w I j∈J S j occurs with negligible probability. It follows from the way we pick W = F ∩ ID (as described above) and from j ∈ W for j ∈ J, that hw(e j ) ≤ k for all j ∈ J. I.e., e j only has non-zero entries with indices in D and |D| ≤ k. Furthermore, from this it also follows that for all j ∈ J the at most k errors in each e j are sitting in the same k positions (those indexed by D). I.e.,
Equations (4), (5) and (6) are in contradiction. Thus the first event occurs with at most negligible probability. We then handle the second event. For simplicity we will assume that all y j = 0 t such that m j = x j and m J = x J . This is without loss of generality following the comment made above about the y j -values canceling out.
Note that all equations stored in F WCOM are of the form
for some constant value x J and some J ⊂ ID. For any J we can rewrite (7) stored in F WCOM as j∈J ∩W
If we let
we can then rewrite (7) as an equation
where ξ J is fixed by the stored (x j , j) for j ∈ W and the constants x J . By assumption the system { j∈J ∩W X j = ξ J } J ∈J is inconsistent. It is an easy piece of linear algebra to see that this means that there exists J 1 , J 2 ⊆ J and V ⊂ W such that
(Simply apply Gaussian elimination to solve the system. This must fail, which will yield a system as above.)
From the last equation we get that
which implies that
Note that the existence of the equation
which means that
Combining, we get that
Using transitivity of = and that w I (S J ) = w I (enc(x J ; r J )) we conclude that
which, implies that
By construction of W , the string J ∈J1∪J2 j∈J \W S j has distance at most k to a codeword encoding J ∈J1∪J2
j∈J \W x j , namely, they differ in at most the k positions in the set D, as we sum only over j ∈ W . By linearity, the string J ∈J1∪J2 enc(x J ; r J ) is a codeword, encoding J ∈J1∪J2 x J . By (9) and I being chosen at random and independent of the view of A * , we have that
except with negligible probability. It then follows from k < d/2 that with overwhelming probability the string J ∈J1∪J2 enc(x J ; r J ) is the only codeword within distance k of J ∈J1∪J2 j∈J \W S j . Hence J ∈J1∪J2 enc(x J ; r J ) must be the codeword encoding
j∈J \W x j . From this it follows that J ∈J1∪J2 enc(x J ; r J ) is an encoding of both J ∈J1∪J2 x J and J ∈J1∪J2
j∈J \W x j . This contradicts (8), and thus the second event can only occur with negligible probability. This concludes the proof. Now all that remains is to show that the simulator can indeed pick a set W as described in the proof. To this end let a set of independent errors, be a set
(recall that E is the matrix with the error vectors of all commitments as its columns). Let the independent errors value ν(E) to be the size of the largest set of independent errors. Lemma 4. The probability that A * is not caught cheating during the setup is ≤ α ν(E) for a positive constant α < 1 independent of ν. In particular, if ν(E) = Θ(k), then A * is caught except with overwhelming probability.
Proof. To see this, let {(r i , c i )} ν i=1 (E) be a maximal set of independent errors. Note that if j ∈ C for some j = c i ∈ {c i } ν i=1 (E) for the challenge C sent by B, i.e., A * is asked to open commitment number j = c i , she must send an opening (x j , r j , j) with enc x j ; r j = N j . Assume namely that she does not: Then ham enc(x j ; r j ), S j ≥ d/2, and from the above it also follows that w I (U j )⊕w I (T j ) = w I (U j ⊕T j ) = w I (S j ), so w I (S j ) = w I (enc(x j ; r j )). Since I is independent of the view of A * , the probability that w I (A) = w I (B),
, which is negligible. If A * does use an opening x j , r j , j with enc x j ; r j = N j , then e j = enc x j ; r j ⊕ S j has a 1 in position r i , so A * is caught with probability at least u n . The probability that j = c i is chosen for opening, i.e., j ∈ C, is at least By Lemma 4 we can henceforth without loss of generality assume that the independent error value of E is less than k.
We then let a pair of error isolating sets be two sets
I.e., sets so that all the ones in E are isolated to at most |D| rows and |F | columns. We let the error isolation value µ(E) be the smallest integer Q such that there exists error isolating sets D and F with |D|, |F | ≤ Q. We show that the error isolation value is less than or equal the independent error value.
Lemma 5. µ(E) ≤ ν(E).
Proof. If E contains only zeros, then µ(E) = 0 = ν(E). Otherwise, we prove the lemma by constructing a set of independent errors G from E, so that µ(E) ≤ |G|: pick (r 1 , c 1 ) to be in G such that E r1,c1 = 1. Then greedily pick values (r i , c i ) such that E ri,ci = 1 and such that r i is different from all r j<i and c i is different from all c j<i , and put these in G. Do this till it is not longer possible to pick a new pair (r i , c i ) . Then by definition of ν we have |G| ≤ ν(E) (since G is a set of independent errors). Furthermore, note that all errors are now isolated to either rows indexed by r i or columns indexed by c i for some pair (r i , c i ) ∈ G. Thus by definition of µ we have µ(E) ≤ |G|.
Finally we show that an pair of almost optimal error isolating sets can be found efficient by simulator. Proof. To construct F and D we proceed as follows: First add the index of any column in E with Hamming weight more than k to F and add the index of any row with Hamming weight more than k to D. There are at most k such columns and k such rows, or we could not have µ(E) ≤ k. Now all remaining rows have at most Hamming weight k. There are at most n remaining rows. This gives a total of nk non-zero entries in the remaining rows. Add the index of any columns with one of these non-zero entries to F . This gives |F | ≤ nk + k.
Lemma 6. When µ(E)
≤
C Proof of complete construction
We here formally prove the theorems and lemmas needed to make our commitment scheme usable in the MiniLEGO protocol in Fig. 7 .
C.1 Oblivious opening
Proof (Theorem 3). We focus on the simulator when simulating the Oblivious-Opening command, since for all other commands we can use the simulator from the proof of Theorem 2. Furthermore, the case of corrupted B is trivial so we will focus on corrupted A. So since in all cases the simulation is indistinguishable from the from the real world protocol, this concludes our proof.
C.2 Less wildcards
Proof (Theorem 4).
In the setup phase the simulator behaves as an honest B while fully controlling the F WCOM functionality. Doing so the simulator can read of the set of wildcard commitments input by corrupt A W when initializing After the setup phase the simulator computes the set W = {i ∈ ID ∩ W |π(i) ∈ W }, i.e., W is the set of wildcard commitments in ID that were paired with another wildcard commitments. To initialize the F COM functionality, (init, ID, W ) with |ID| = µ and |W | ≤ k, the simulator then inputs ID as the set of commitment identifiers and W as the set of wildcard commitments. This makes F COM output ID to B and simulation is clearly perfect.
From this point on the simulator is going to simulate the F WCOM functionality by essentially just forwarding messages between A and F COM . Note though that if A gives an input to F WCOM with an id j ∈ ID \ ID then this input cannot simply be forwarded to F COM because that functionality only knows about id's in ID. This is not a problem though because for any such input A could make, F WCOM outputs j to B and honest B terminates. So, in case of such an input the simulator just terminates the protocol. In the following we will assume that A only makes inputs to F WCOM with id's in ID.
To simulate the j'th commitment the simulator records the value (y j , j) sent by A. If j ∈ W \ W the simulator lets m j = (x π(j) ⊕ z j ) ⊕ y j . Otherwise, the simulator lets m j = x j ⊕ y j . Then the simulator inputs (commit, j, m j ) to the F COM , and the functionality outputs (commit, j) to B.
Note that for j ∈ ID \ W the F COM functionality used in the ideal world stores the equation X j = x j ⊕ y j while the F WCOM functionality used in the real world would have stored X j = x j . Furthermore, for j ∈ W \W F COM stores X j = x π(j) ⊕ z j ⊕ y j while F WCOM stores X j ⊕ X π(j) = z j and X π(j) = x π(j) . Thus, ignoring the correction values, the restrictions on how to open commitment j ∈ ID is equivalent in both worlds. I.e., the XOR of commitments in any set J ⊂ ID can, in the real world, be opened to x J using F WCOM if and only if the XOR of commitments in J can be opened to m J = x J ⊕ j∈J y j in the ideal world using The only thing left to argue is that with overwhelming probability |W | ≤ k. Consider any of µ pairs of commitments opened in the setup phase. The probability that both commitments in this pair are wildcard commitments less than where the last inequality is by µ > (nk + k) 2 .
C.3 Or-Opening
Proof (Theorem 5). From Theorem 4 we have that the protocol implements the Setup, Commit, Open and Oblivious-Opening commands of F COM with |ID| = µ + 6kω and |W | ≤ k in the (F WCOM )-hybrid model when initializing F WCOM with |ID | = µ = 2(µ + 6kω) and |W | ≤ nk + k. So in the rest of this proof we will simply assume that we have access to these commands of F COM with |ID| = µ + 6kω and |W | ≤ k. So for these commands the simulator simply simulates all interaction between A and F WCOM by interacting correspondingly with the F COM functionality and recording all messages. Clearly this simulation is perfect, so for the remainder of proof we will concentrate on the Or-Opening command.
For the Or-Opening the simulator acts as the honest B. Note that since the simulator has recorded all messages between A and F WCOM it can simulate the F WCOM functionality perfectly. This means that when the simulator rejects the opening the simulation has been perfect.
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Assuming that the opening was not rejected, the simulator then needs to interact with F COM so that the functionality outputs (OR-open, J 0 , J 1 , m) to B with overwhelming probability. I.e., the simulator must find an a so that either J a ∩ W = ∅ and j∈J a m j = m or J a ∩ W = ∅ and the equations stored in the F COM functionality allows to corruptly open the XOR of commitments J a to m.
To show that the simulator can do this we first show that, given the opening was not rejected, there exists an i ∈ [3k] and a j We then have that for each i ∈ H the opening will reject with probability at least On the other hand for each i ∈ H the opening will also reject with probability at least J 1 , m) to B and the simulation is indistinguishable to the real world protocol.
To conclude the proof we must show that with overwhelming probability |H| ≥ k. To see this we use that if |D d ∩ W | ≤ s then |H| ≥ 3k − 2s. Thus we will show that |D d ∩ W | ≤ k with overwhelming probability.
Consider some j ∈ D d and assume
then the probability that j ∈ W is k/((µ + 6kω) − 6kω + 1) = k/(µ + 1). Therefore, for each j ∈ j I.e., we have shown that H has size at least k with overwhelming probability. k Statistical security parameter t Computational security parameter s Amount of AND gates in a circuit Amount of input and output bits to the circuit n Size of commitments in bits, Θ(k) u Size of message to commit to in bits φ The randomness used in the XOR-homomorphic commitments d The minimum distance of the secret sharing error correcting code (ssecc) w Defined such that d = 2w + 1 and w < n/2 µ Variable expressing the amount of commitments in a given protocol κ Variable expressing amount of wildcard commitments in a given protocol ω Amount of Or-Openings ρ Replication factor. Defined as ρ = O(k/ log(s)) Γ Gates in the replicated circuit. Defined as 2ρs Γ Keys in the replicated circuit. Defined as 3Γ + 1
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